The attitudes and values of cultural and creative workers are an important element of explaining current academic interest in inequality and culture. To date, quantitative approaches to this element of cultural and creative inequality has been overlooked, particularly in British research. This paper investigates the attitudes of those working in creative jobs with a unique dataset, a web survey of creative Using principal components analysis and regression, we have three main findings. First, in contrast to Richard Florida's thesis on the attitudes and values attitudes were no more meritocratic than those of the general population. Second, those with the strongest belief in meritocracy in the sector are those in the most privileged positions, specifically those are best-rewarded by the sector. Third, our research provides support for existing qualitative research on attitudes in the cultural sector, in which the worst-rewarded workers are most aware of structural inequality. We conclude that the attitudes held by creative workers, and who holds which attitudes, make it unlikely that access to the sector and trajectories of individual progression within the sector will change. These findings also have important implications for current public interest in whether access to creative work is limited to those from privileged backgrounds.
and meritocratic attitudes than the rest of the (American) society in which they lived.
In the British context, from where our data is drawn, there is a tradition of qualitative engagement with ethnographic and interview data that has revealed a variety of orientations O B O 2015 for a review), including theorising the sense of guilt or failure when confronted with the structural inequalities endemic to the creative sector (McRobbie 2016) . Our present study is unique as it explores these issues quantitatively, drawing on attitudinal research literature which contextualises cultural workers in terms of broader social understandings of inequality.
As a result, the paper makes three core contributions. Our analysis shows cultural workers, in surprising contrast to the Floridian (2002) thesis of being open and meritocratic, have attitudes to inequality that are broadly similar to the general population. We demonstrate that, in our dataset, those with the strongest attachment to meritocratic views, that the cultural sector rewards hard work and talent, are those in the highest paid occupational locations. In support of McRobbie (2015) , we find that younger respondents who are well paid are less likely to hold critical or socially transformative attitudes, offering qualified support for the idea of individualisation as a useful lens with which to view the cultural sector.
T attitudes, also has importance for public, media, and policy discussions. The view of the arts as potentially socially transformative, rewarding talent and hard work, has an important place in how the cultural sector is narrated in contemporary society (e.g. Hancock 2016) . It is present L Our data and analysis suggests workers in the sector share this narrative. However, if it is the case that those working in the sector believe in its fairness, in light of the recent relentlessness of media reports on inequality in culture, the prospects for social change may be rather limited. To explore this point further, we begin by discussing existing research on cultural work, move through a discussion of academic understandings of social attitudes towards meritocracy, before presenting our data, analysis and the conclusions supporting our academic and, more publically troubling, conclusions.
1.1: Studying cultural and creative work
There are longstanding academic debates, research programmes and disciplinary traditions associated with the study of Cultural and Creative Industries (CCIs). We can think through this literature as having three phases and three distinct forms associated with a range of differing positions on the virtues, or otherwise, of working in a cultural or creative job. This analysis of the cultural labour force raises two questions. On the one hand there is a question of how this social structure is experienced, something of which the existing literature surveyed above has offered a detailed overview. Second, and less well developed in existing work, is the question of how these structures are perpetuated through attitudes and assumptions of those occupied in cultural labour. There is thus still a need to understand how barriers to getting in and getting on operate. Here understanding broader attitudes towards inequality, as a route to understanding how these attitudes function within creative work, is essential.
1.3: What do we know about attitudes to inequality?
Crucially, it does not follow that inequalities in CCIs mean that people working in or around
CCIs believe that the sector is unequal: for example, people in the sector may erroneously believe that people from different class backgrounds are paid the same. In addition, people may acknowledge that inequalities exist, but they may believe that inequalities are just and fair: they may believe that success is overwhelmingly determined by talent, and they may believe the most talented people happen to come disproportionately from privileged backgrounds.
Both within and beyond the CCIs, p dimensions, including both knowledge of inequality and normative beliefs about inequality.
McCall and Chin (2013) Here, we focus on perceived inequality of opportunity (Brunori 2015) . This dimension is measured by presenting respondents with a battery of items, and asking how important each of those is in terms of getting ahead. Respondents who report that coming from a wealthy family, knowing the right people, and having been born a man are all essential to getting ahead might be considered to perceive inequality of opportunity as high, while a respondent who considers those items to be not at all important, while holding ambition and hard work as essential, might be considered to perceive inequality of opportunity as low. Studies using these batteries of questions tend to find that are that processes err on the side of fairness, with overall higher scores on items like hard work than coming from a wealthy family . However, this varies internationally, with people in richer countries generally believing that processes are fairer than do people in poorer countries (Brunori 2015) . In addition, men generally perceive greater inequality, as do older However, while these relationships vary cross-nationally, the correlations between attitudes themselves are relatively stable. Both Hanson and Wells-Dang (2009) and Reynolds and Xian (2014) use factor analysis on the batteries of questions in order to either construct or validate scales; in this way, they investigate whether people who rate being a man as important rate talen as being less important. In both papers, there are fairly coherent scales constitutive of effort, hard work, and similar. These are described as either meritocracy or human capital .
Higher scores on these scales correspond to more egalitarian beliefs about how society works.
Both papers also find two scales that can be considered to be in tension with this, ascriptive or structural , and discrimination or friends and family . The first of these consists of race, religion, and gender; the latter consists of coming from a wealthy family and knowing the right people. While high scores on each of these scales both correspond to less egalitarian beliefs about how society works, they are also distinct from each other; it is plausible to believe that discrimination takes place because of who you know rather than more fundamental demographic issues. Finally, Hanson and Wells-Dang find a fourth factor, with the heaviest loadings coming from This can be seen as being relatively orthogonal to questions of fairness; it is possible to construct narratives around education being used as an arbitrary barrier to entry, and around it being a way to suitably train people for roles.
In addition, while these dimensions differ in their perceived inequality of opportunity those with higher scores on meritocracy are likely to perceive inequality of opportunity as lower, while those with higher scores on discrimination are likely to perceive it as higher the dimensions are not at odds with each other. As they are constructed via principal components analysis, the dimensions are relatively independent of one another. In addition, it is not -working and talented and to be a white man from a wealthy family: someone holding such a position might recognise structural discrimination, while believing that privileged people can only get ahead if they are also talented and hard-working. Similarly, some people score low on all these dimensions; this might reflect that they believe that who gets ahead is more-or-less random, or indeed that the questions.
The relevance of these attitudes to the cultural and creative industries is clear. Brunori (2015) shows that, in general, people in rich societies tend to think those societies are meritocratic.
However, if the creative class hypothesis is correct (Florida, 2002) , and people working in the cultural and creative industries tend to be more left-wing and more liberal than the overall population, with attitudes of tolerance and openness and a commitment to meritocracy, it follows that those people are likely to at least think more critically about who gets ahead. This is particularly salient, given both the research surveyed earlier in this paper which shows structural exclusions in cultural jobs, and the fact that these structural exclusions are wellknown to participants (see eg Friedman and O B 2017 on the acting profession). As a result, one would expect people working in the cultural and creative industries to be more conscious of processes of social reproduction, and more critical of meritocratic accounts of the cultural sector in which the cream rises to the top.
The cultural and creative industries are, of course, not a monoculture. Even if overall attitudes within the sector are more sceptical of a meritocratic account of success as compared to attitudes across society, structural effects may persist. These effects would be as a result of overrepresented groups being less likely to acknowledge the inequalities that may have smoothed the processes leading to their own professional success.
In the event that members of groups who experience exclusion are more alert to the exclusion itself, we would expect faith in meritocracy to be weaker for those groups of non-white, nonmale, less affluent origin individuals, and for communities that are under-represented in cultural work and experience exclusions from cultural labour markets. However, as our data will demonstrate, the picture is complex, showing a cluster of occupations whose practitioners have a strong belief in the meritocratic nature of cultural work, albeit one that is strongly socially stratified.
2: Data and methods
Data were collected over the period 21 September-20 October 2015, via an online survey G D industries? Take our survey on divers T partnership between academics and a range of cultural organisations seeking to understand issues of inequality in the sector, accompanying a series of events on the same topic across
England; this partnership is described at more length at this link. At its launch, the survey was ed across social media across the lifespan of the survey. This included publicity from prominent organisations
Because of this recruitment method, this is a non-representative sample and should be treated in that way. While results may be indicative of a population of people working in the CCIs, they also may not; conclusions are limited to those participants who opted in to the survey.
However, as the introduction has indicated, these issues are supported by existing, more representative, survey material. I their social origins, and demographic characteristics were designed so that responses could be compared with those in the rolling and nationally-representative Labour Force Survey (LFS), while questions about social contacts were designed to be comparable with those in the Cultural Capital and Social Exclusion survey (Bennett et al, 2008) . By using comparable questions we can identify how different the sample is from the population its members are drawn from.
These efforts have been made to benchmark the sample against the population against which its members have been drawn from, precisely because of the difficulties associated with recruiting a large sample of people working in the cultural and creative industries. Recent work on the social composition of the cultural and creative industry workforce (O B et al 2016) has been limited to analysis of the LFS. While the LFS is nationally representative, it consists of relatively few people working within the sector, and contains no attitudinal questions at all.
The LFS is an ideal data source for understanding the social makeup of the CCIs, but not for understanding more specific labour practices within the sector, nor for understanding attitudes and beliefs within the sector. Data were therefore collected through this online platform and with partners to maximise responses from the CCIs on the practices and beliefs not covered by LFS.
In total, there were 2540 responses to the survey, of which an estimated 53 were duplicates, Here, we focus on the questions about getting ahead. We use the battery of questions described above about perceived inequality of opportunity, validated in a variety of different national and cross-national contexts (eg Brunori, 2015; Reynolds and Xian, 2014; Hanson and Wells-Dang, 2015) . In most surveys, the question is asked Please tick one box for each of these to show how important you think it is , and presented with a series of items. In this case, the options remain the same, but the stimulus is changed to Looking at your creative occupation as a whole, how important do you think each of these is in getting ahead? . Responses to these questions should be seen in the context of the questions that precede it; immediately before these questions, respondents were asked about income and about working for free.
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we report descriptive statistics of each of the items within this bank of questions, and for relevant indicator variables. Second, we describe principal components analysis on this same bank of questions, in order to identify whether these items can be reduced to a smaller number of latent variables. Third, we use regressions to understand how attitudes towards inequality vary between groups, whether those people in more privileged positions and from more privileged backgrounds are more likely to find the cultural sector fair and equitable. Analysis was conducted in Stata 14.1, and graphics were prepared in R using the ggplot2 package. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for relevant indicator variables, and Figure 1 shows the distributions of responses to each item in the bank of questions about getting ahead, on a . CCIs overall, and a similar figure to that of the overall UK population; however, this looks unusually white given that a huge 45% of respondents were based in London, which was overall 60% white at the 2011 census. Finally, the mean age in the sample is just under 37 (compared with just over 41 for the CCIs overall: O B et al 2016, table A2), and relatively few respondents are new to their sector, with just 13% having worked in it for less than a year.
3: Results

3.1: Descriptive statistics
The CCI workers that make up our survey are clearly different from the CCIs across the Labour Force Survey in a number of ways. We have more actors, musicians and other performers, while we have fewer programmers; we have more women; we have more people living in London. Given recruitment was opt-in, participants are those who recognise themselves as working in the cultural and creative industries, and who find out about a survey hosted at the Guardian (likely through unions and relevant professional bodies). Indeed, these are the sectors who receive more of the celebratory discourse around the cultural and creative industries, in spite of representing a relatively small part of their workforce and an even smaller part of contribution to GDP for which they are often lauded. In this way, it is closer to representing an ideal type image of the CCIs: probably young, highly-educated women in London whose parents had middle class jobs. Figure 1 shows that the highest-rated attribute overall for getting ahead is hard work , rated essential by 62% of the sample, and followed closely behind by ambition , rated essential by 54% of the sample. At the opposite extreme is your religion , rated not important at all by 67% of the sample, followed by your ethnicity at 35% (and another 25% not very important ).
In general, figure 1 indicates that attributes associated with a meritocratic account of the CCIs are more highly-regarded than attributes associated with an account consistent with reproduction, with one exception These results are broadly similar to those in other studies, indicating that our CCI respondents hold similar attitudes about inequality of opportunity in their sectors as people living in rich countries do about the societies in which they live. Whether this is in tension with the creative class thesis depends on O the thesis suggests that the CCIs appropriate that people within that sector are more likely to report that talent and hard work are essential than class and coming from a wealthy family. On the other, as section 1.2 shows, there are major systematic inequalities in the CCIs. Holding these attitudes suggests either our respondents are unaware of these inequalities, or that they believe that the processes leading to these inequalities are legitimate.
3.2: Principal components analysis
As with other studies using the same or similar questions, in order to identify latent variables representing broad attitudes towards getting ahead we use principal components analysis and conduct a varimax rotation, with a minimum eigenvector value of 1. This analysis retains 3 factors, with loadings shown in figure 2 , and with a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of sampling adequacy of 0.85, providing support for the use of principal components analysis. and religion has a weighting on the reproduction factor of over 0.3; the same is true for ambition, hard work, and talent on the meritocracy factor. A third factor is dominated by your education , although having well-educated parents is also prominent. Each item in the battery of questions has a loading of at least 0.3 onto exactly one factor.
The crucial difference between these results and those in the other papers described above is the fact that non-meritocratic variables are all in a single factor, while in other work these variables can be distinguished into friends and family and discrimination . In other studies, it is consistent to hold that being well-connected is crucial for getting ahead while factors associated with more explicit discrimination, such as racism, are not salient. Instead, here, they are coherent in a single reproduction factor. The other factors, meritocracy and education , This means there are three basic dimensions of attitudes for people working in the CCIs.
People who believe that coming from a wealthy family is important tend to also believe that knowing the right people is important, as are class, gender, and ethnicity. We do not see the difference seen in other studies, in which people who believe that knowing the right people is essential do not necessarily believe that class, gender, and ethnicity are. In our data these attitudes tend to coincide. On this basis, discussing attitudes to success among people working CCI in education is validated by the analysis. The next stage is to identify who holds which of these attitudes.
Regression results
Is it the white men from middle class backgrounds who are most likely to believe that culture is meritocratic, and that social reproduction does not have a major role to play? In this section,
we report the results of regressions with each factor as a dependent variable, to understand which variables most strongly predict attitudes. There are three parallel models, across which the independent variables are the same; the differences are the dependent variables.
We have chosen independent variables to understand whether people who are structurally advantaged in the CCIs are more likely to believe that the sector is meritocratic than those , whether white men people from middleprocesses that underpinned their success are basically fair. We also reflect on current position in the sector, measured through their longevity and through their current pay, to reflect on whether meritocratic attitudes are also held by those most able to make decisions in the sector. If those who determine how hiring works in the CCIs are also those who think that the current process is meritocratic, it is unlikely that this process will change, and patterns of inequality reflected in the sector will persist.
While tests for multicollinearity do not raise questions, with the only variance inflation factors over 10 deriving from the squared age term, the second dependent variable is left-skewed (see figure 2) , with models predicting this variable showing deviations from a normal quantilequantile plot, and with heteroskedastic residuals. Because of these issues, we use robust standard errors to account for the divergences from the assumptions of simple ordinary least squares regressions. Of the three models, by far the highest R squared value is from the model predicting the reproduction factor. We follow by briefly summarising the results of each model, followed by reflection on the results across all three.
We first address the model predicting the education factor. The only things associated with large coefficients 2 for which they work. People working in each of publishing and architecture hold particularly high scores on this factor. This is unsurprising, as in the case of architecture holding higher-level qualifications in the discipline is necessary in order to practice, while in publishing a large fraction of workers have postgraduate qualifications. Meanwhile, people working in IT are particularly unlikely to think education is important to getting ahead.
Other than those variables, though, no other is strongly associated with this factor; this is also reflected in the particularly low R-squared for this model.
The model predicting the meritocracy factor varies by more of the independent variables, although several still have relatively small associations. Younger people have higher meritocracy scores, although the difference between an 18-year old and a 25-year old are smaller than those between a 48-year old and a 55-year old, as shown by the quadratic term.
Women score higher on this scale than do men. Sector-wise, people in each of crafts and design have higher scores than the average, while people working in museums and galleries score lowest of all on this scale. C does their income, with very large differences between the highest and lowest parts of the scale. H . People from traditional professional backgrounds score higher than others, but not wildly, and the differences between other parental backgrounds are marginal. Regional variation is fairly low.
This model has a scarcely higher R-squared than that for education, implying that it is not the case that groups who are more systematically advantaged within the cultural sector are more likely to believe that the processes through which people get ahead are more legitimate compared with people who do not have those same systematic advantages.
The model predicting the reproduction factor reflects that of the meritocracy factor in some ways, but not all. Women score higher on this factor, as they do on meritocracy, and there is T for meritocracy However, while the differences for people from traditional professional backgrounds are roughly as negative as are even larger. However, while on the meritocracy factor there were only small differences by disability and ethnicity, on reproduction people with disabilities score moderately higher than people without disabilities, and white people score drastically lower than non-white people. Finally, occupational differences also vary: here, the groups with highest scores on When we compare the three models, it is immediately clear that the starkest differences are found in the model predicting belief in social reproduction: this model has both the highest Rsquare and the largest coefficients. In some ways, this reflects the larger variance within this category: almost everyone thinks that hard work and talent are important in terms of getting ahead, with the crucial differences in the meritocracy scale being between the highly-paid and everyone else. By contrast, mean scores on the items that make up the reproduction scale are lower, and differences on these scores differ more consistently across groups of interest. While the crucial difference on the meritocracy scale was about pay, the differences between the high-and low-paid on reproduction are twice the size of those on meritocracy, with additional differences on ethnicity and disability. Surprisingly, women score higher than men on both of these scales.
Perhaps the most surprising finding is the relatively small coefficients associated with . The only significant differences between those people whose parents had non-managerial or professional jobs are those whose parents were traditional professionals. This is surprising for two reasons. The first is that one might expect that the magnitude of the differences in incomes between people of different class backgrounds, discussed above, would translate into differences between these groups in their recognition of how one becomes successful. The second is the moderate numbers of people reporting believing that coming from a wealthy family and your class are important to getting ahead.
While these numbers are dwarfed by those for knowing the right people and your talent , it seems here that the belief that class background is moderately important does not map on to people from different class backgrounds having different attitudes towards what is important in getting ahead.
One concern with the models is that, due to the sampling method, they might disproportionately weight people who might not be classified as working in the CCIs in other sources of data: for example, people earning small amounts of money from their practice, and people whose main source of income is not their cultural and creative practice. In order to assess whether these results are driven by these groups of people, we also run the model excluding first people whose main source of income is not their cultural and creative practice, and second excluding people whose earnings from their cultural and creative practice are less than £5,000 pa. Making these changes leads to no estimates changing by as much as two standard errors.
More generally, these results make fairly grim reading for those who hope that inequalities in the cultural and creative industries might diminish. As shown in figure 1, almost everyone believes that hard work, talent, and ambition are essential to getting ahead, while class, gender, ethnicity, and coming from a wealthy family are not. People in better positions in the sector those who are the most highly-paid, and most likely to recruit and elevate the next generation believe most strongly in the meritocratic account of the sector, and are most sceptical of the role of social reproduction. Most strikingly, these attitudes persist whether people come from privileged backgrounds or not. It seems that once people have achieved success within the sector their attitudes towards how one achieves success are similar regardless of background, and in spite of the substantial body of literature suggesting different
4: Discussion and Conclusion
There is a straightforward positive reading of these results: The workers who responded to our survey think that the sector is more or less fair, with hard work being the most important thing for getting ahead, and the least important things being religion, gender, ethnicity and class.
However, this account is complicated by asking who, exactly, thinks that these are the most and least important things respectively. The people in our survey data who are least likely to say that the process of getting ahead reflects more general social reproduction are highly-paid non-disabled white men.
We might answer the question what do cultural workers think about inequality? by saying the same as everyone else . This is a surprising finding given the Floridian (2002) narrative associated with the sectors supposedly more open, tolerant and meritocratic attitudes. It is also worth remarking on in the context of the discussions that opened this paper, whereby the sector is not the boys in the band and the sisterhood , rather it is much as other parts of contemporary society in its attitude towards inequality. There are surprises for example, survey respondents attitudes towards the importance of knowing the right people and coming from a wealthy family load onto the same single factor as your ethnicity and your class, and women score higher on both the meritocracy and reproduction factors but there is nothing here that indicates that the attitudes of our survey respondents are radically different from those working in other sectors, or in none at all. This may imply that awareness of issues of access to the CCIs have not got through to this section of people who work in them, or at least to any greater extent than the general population. This might be considered surprising, given how high-profile the debate around issues of access were at the time of data collection.
Alternatively, it may be that the issue was high-profile but survey respondents rejected accounts in which access to the sector was unequal; this may have felt necessary in order for people to justify their own success, preferring to feel that their success in the sector was due to their own individual traits rather than more general structural issues. This may be particularly relevant given that the people whose account is most in the direction of fairness are the people who are most handsomely rewarded by the sector. Indeed, this sits in the context in which there are two different dimensions through which cultural workers express their attitudes towards inequality reproduction and meritocracy and it is not just the case that the better-rewarded are more likely to ascribe success to talent, but that they are even more likely to deny the relationship between success and structural factors.
However, one surprising finding, given the recent academic focus on class (e.g. Allen et al 2017) and its impact on the CCIs, is the relatively weak relationship between attitudes towards inequality and class origin. Even if we account for the fact that self-reported descriptions of conditions. This is surprising, as one might expect that survey respondents whose transition into working in the CCIs has been relatively smooth, via elite (expensive) institutions and the ability to work for free for long periods without hardship, would be less likely to see structural barriers, whereas those people who have directly experienced them would be more likely to do so. This is, at least, the narrative one expects given public discussion of inequality in access to the sector. It also suggests the need for more work on the causal, rather than just the correlative, relationships between class inequalities and production, consumption and representation in CCIs (Allen et al 2017), so as to better explain, in our dataset, the relatively weak relationship between social class origin and attitudes.
While we must be cautious about generalisation, given these results, there is no reason to imagine that the situation we have discussed is likely to change. According to analysis of our survey respondents, access to the CCIs is still constrained by structural factors. These structural This paper has explored attitudes prevailing within cultural and creative occupations, with a focus on inequality. This focus aimed to respond both to media interest in inequality and cultural jobs, as well as extending current academic understandings of cultural and creative work. It offers important implications for future research. First, as the discussion has indicated, attitudes towards inequality in the sample are in keeping with broader social attitudes, suggesting cultural and creative labour is neither more nor less well disposed to social critique than other occupations. Concurrently, this finding casts doubt on research that suggests these occupations exhibit more meritocratic attitudes than the rest of society. Both critical and Second, the findings and discussion query the transformative potential of the cultural sector,
given that it displays a belief in the meritocratic nature of cultural jobs and that belief is stronger in those with higher incomes. These attitudes are at odds with research on both the The positive reading, which is associated with the idea that people think the sector in which they work is fair and meritocratic, is most troubling, given the research that has revelled the structural and overwhelming inequalities within cultural work. As a result, we should expect more media attention to address questions of access, representation and consumption but there is little indication that these controversies will challenge the faith individual cultural workers have in the role that hard work and talent plays in getting in and getting on. 
